Landmark Judgments in Family Law for UGC Net Law Into Legal World Landmark judgment Sat, May 13, 2023, at ,03:48 PM Mohd. Ahmed Khan vs Shah Bano Begum And Ors 1985 In this case, Supreme Court granted the maintenance to a divorced muslim woman irrespective of what the Muslim personal law says. Supreme Court held that Section 125 of CrPc is also applicable on Muslims. Supreme Court concluded that Cr.P.C. is a secular law and “there is no conflict between the provisions of section 125 and those of the Muslim Personal Law on the question of the Muslim husband’s obligation to provide maintenance for a divorced wife who is unable to maintain herself.” A muslim woman is entittled for the maintainance even after the period of iddat. Ahmedabad Women Action Group (AWAG) v. Union of India (AIR (1997) The court was of the opinion that India and Indians have been governed by personal laws, regardless of the time period. It was of the opinion that an interference by the court would lead to several undesirable outcomes, as the adjudication of personal laws was beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. The petition was therefore dismissed. Danial Latifi and another v. Union of India (2001) The court held that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which provided that under section 3(1)(a), a divorced woman is entitled to reasonable and fair provisions, and maintenance within the ‘iddat’ period is not in violation of Article 14 and 21 of the Indian constitution. Shamim Ara v. State of U.P. In this case the Supreme Court was of the view that the mere plea of a Talaq, would not validate the same. There Quranic procedures of obtaining a Talaq need to be fulfilled, i.e., Talaq has to be pronounced in the Quranic injunction. Shayara Bano v. Union of India and others Supreme Court in 2017 in a historic and landmark judgment declared “Triple Talaq” unconstitutional. The Apex Court said, “Given the fact triple talaq is instant and irrevocable, it has no scope of arbitration which is essential for saving marriage ties. Hence, it is clear that this form of Talaq is manifestly arbitrary in the sense that the marital tie can be broken capriciously and whimsically by a Muslim man without any attempt at reconciliation so as to save it. The court invalidated Section 2 of Shariat Application Act, 1937 to the extent it enforces “triple talaq”. Chand Patel v. Bismillah Begum, 1 (2008) The Supreme Court that a Muslim’s marriage to his wife’s sister may be , while the earlier marriage still subsists, will be irregular but the second wife and children are entitled to maintenance. The Muslim personal law prohibits “unlawful conjunction”- a man cannot marry his wife’s sister in her lifetime or till the dissolution of their marriage but that doesn’t affect her entitlement to maintenance. Sarla Mudgal vs. Union of India The Court held that if a Hindu converts to Muslim and then have a second marriage, he can not do so, irrespective of the fact that polygamy is allowed in Islamic Law. Yousuf v. Sowramina It was held that at times, the determination of the question whether in fact a marriage has broken down or not is left to the courts. At other times, the legislature lays down the criterion of breakdown of a marriage and if that is established, the courts have no option but to dissolve the marriage. Lily Thomas vs. Union of India When a non-Muslim man, married according to the religious rites stipulating monogamy, renounces his religion, converts to Islam and solemnizes a second marriage according rites without divorcing his first wife. Supreme Court held that husband is guilty of bigamy. Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha Considering Sec 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 the marriage performed in absence of customary rites and ceremonies of either parties to marriage is not valid. And Mere intention of the parties to live together as husband and wife is not enough. Further, there is no scope to include a woman not lawfully married within the expression of ‘wife’ in Section 125 of the Code should be interpreted to mean only a legally wedded wife. Ganeshji vs. Hastuben Where the wife on an account of structural malformation of vagina was not capable to have normal sexual intercourse. But she underwent surgical operation as a result of which she became capable of having sexual intercourse. It was held that she was not impotent. Laxmi vs. Babulal Wife had no vagina, but by a surgical operation an artificial vagina was constructed. The Court held that that did not remove wife‘s impotency. In Ganeshji Case there was vagina but in this case there was no vagina from the very beginning. Jagdish vs. Seela Where immediately after marriage the husband lived for three nights and days in the same room with his wife and failed to consummate the marriage, it was a fair inference that non consummation was due to husband‘ knowing refusal arising out of incapacity , nervousness or hysteria. Prajapati vs. Hastubai Barrenness and Sterlity- Marriage is valid. Shewanti vs. Bhaura Barrenness and Sterlity- Marriage is valid. Corbett vs. Corbett Marriage between same sexes is void ab initio. Sexual constitution of an individual is fixed by birth and can‘t be changed either by the natural development of organs of opposite sex or medical or surgical means. Mahendra vs. Sushila Wife‘s admission of pre-marriage pregnancy when it is established that the petitioner had no access prior to marriage, is sufficient in itself to establish the fact against her. Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande vs. State of Maharashtra Essential ceremonies of Hindu Marriage are; (1) Invocation before the sacred fire and (2) Saptapadi Dr. N.A.Mukerji vs. State A physician was prosecuted for bigamy. It was alleged that three ceremonies of marriage were performed. The Court held that performance of such mock ceremonies of marriage does not constitute valid ceremonies, and therefore the prosecution for bigamy failed. There mere intention of parties however serious, will not make them husband and wife and the accused will escape prosecution even if he deliberately performed a defective ceremony. P.V.Venkataramana vs. State The Court held that any marriage between minors aged 13 and 9 is perfectly valid. Reason- (1)Section 4 (2) Factum Valet (A fact can notaltered by a hundreds texts) Seema v. Ashwani Kumar The Supreme Court in this case directed the State Governments and the Central Government that marriages of all persons who are citizens of India belonging to various religious denominations should be made compulsorily registerable in their respective States where such marriages are solemnized. T.Sareetha vs. T.V.Subbaih. Section 9 of HMA is unconstitutional. Reason-It is violation of right to privacy and right to life enshrined in Article 21 of Constitution of India. Harvinder Kaur vs. Harmander Singh Choudhry Section 9 of HMA is Constitutional. Saroj Rani v Sudarshan Kumar The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 9 by saying that it serves a social purpose as an aid to the prevention of break-up of the marriage. Sushil Kumari Dang v. Prem Kumar Here, a petition for restitution of conjugal right is filed by the husband and the husband accuses his wife for adulterous conduct. Following which he filed another petition for judicial separation which shows the extent of his sincerity and interest in keeping the wife with him. So, the Delhi High Court set aside the decree of restitution granted by the lower court. Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash, 1 (1991) The SC settled the controversy by ruling that at the time of second motion under Section 13(B) HMA, one of the parties of the marriage withdraws the consent given to the petition, and then decree for divorce on mutual consent cannot be passed. Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah v. Prabhavati, AIR 1957 The SC held that for the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. Oxford vs. Oxford A wife who allows her to be artificially inseminated with semen provided by a person other than her husband is not guilty of adultery. Subbaramma vs. Saraswathi After midnight in her bedroom in actual physical juxtaposition- adultery Rajesh Kumar Singh vs. Rekha Singh Rape cannot be ground of divorce. Sexual intercourse has to be consensual for it to be a ground of divorce. Russel v Russel Conduct of such a character as to have caused danger to life, limb, or health, bodily or mental , or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such danger. Naveen Kohli vs. Neelu Kohli The Supreme Court observed that the conduct complained of should be grave and weighty.It should be such that no reasonable person should tolerate it . It should not be ordinary wear and tear of marriage. Itwari v. Asghari, AIR 1960 The court held that even in the absence of satisfactory proof of the husband’s cruelty, the Court will not pass a decree for restitution in favour of the husband if, on the evidence, it feels that the circumstances are such that it will be unjust and inequitable to compel her to live with him. Romesh Chander vs. Savitri Considering the facts and circumstances of this case we, in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, direct that the marriage between appellant and the respondent shall stand dissolved. 25 years had elapsed since the appellant-husband a sanitary inspector and respondent a school teacher had enjoyed the company of each other. N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane, AIR 1975 Five tests were laid down in determining whether a given conduct amounts to legal cruelty. They are the following: The alleged acts constituting cruelty should be proved according to the law of evidence; There should be an apprehension in the petitioner’s mind of real injury or harm from such conduct; The apprehension should be reasonable having regard to the socio-economic and psycho- physical condition of the parties; The petitioner should not have taken advantage of his position; The petitioner should not by his or her conduct have condoned the acts of cruelty. Dharmendra Kumar v. Usha Kumar, AIR 1977 Mere non-compliance with a decree for restitution does not constitute wrong within the meaning of section 23(1)(a). Nachhattar Singh v. Harcharan Kaur AIR 1996 If both the parties had voluntarily consented to file the petition for dissolving the marriage by mutual consent and all the other conditions mentioned in sub- sec. (1) of S. 13B of the Act are fulfilled, it will not be open to a party to withdraw the consent. Asha Qureshi v. Afaq Qureshi, AIR 2002 MP 263 The Court held that a person is entitled to a decree of nullity under Section 25(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act on grounds of fraud as described in Section 17 of the Indian Contracts Act. Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur The Supreme Court held that the period mentioned in Section 13B(2) is not mandatory but directory. Suman Singh v. Sanjay Singh The court held that few isolated incidents of long past and that too found to have been condoned due to compromising behavior of the parties cannot constitute an act of cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act. In cruelty, mens rea is not important V. Bhagat vs D. Bhagat Mental cruelty was defined. Balveer Singh v. Harjeet Kaur While deciding this issue, the High Court referred to the impugned provisions and made the following key observations in the case: That on a simple reading of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, it has altogether a different purpose. The purpose of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is to meet a contingency. Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and Section 13-A of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 are framed to meet a separate set of contingencies. If Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is either decreed or dismissed, it will not take away a right of a party to file Section 13-A of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for dissolution of marriage at any subsequent stage. Mrs. Christine Lazarus Menezes v. Mr. Lazarus Peter Menezes (Bombay High Court) The Court noted that if the Criminal Complaint filed by the appellant wife against her husband was false and was filed only to bring back her husband and consequent to which he was arrested and was in jail for about 7 days, it would constitute a clear case of cruelty by the wife against her husband. Amar Kanta Sen v. Sovana Sen, AIR 1960 Supreme Court in this case held that when a wife deliberately persist on not getting a job even she easily can, is an undue advantage. The court only allowed starving allowance in this case. Shanti Devi v. Govind Singh The Court held that for constituting ‘desertion’ two essential conditions must be fulfilled namely (i) the factum of separation; and (ii) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end. Meghanatha Nayyar v. Smt. Susheela The Madras High Court had observed that Section 14 provides restrictions presumably designed to prevent party from taking recourse to legal proceedings before the parties have made real effort to save their marriage from disaster. Neeraja Saraph v Jayant Saraph (1994) The Supreme Court gave some important obiter observations in this case: No marriage between a NRI and an Indian woman which has taken place in India may be annulled by a foreign court. Provision may be made for adequate alimony to the wife in the property of the husband both in India and abroad. The decree granted by Indian courts may be made executable in foreign courts both on principle of comity and by entering into reciprocal agreements like Section 44-A of the Civil Procedure Code which makes a foreign decree executable as it would have been a decree passed by that court. Lata Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2006 Noting that there was no bar to inter-caste marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court comprising of Justice Ashok Bhan and Justice Markandey Katju observed that since there was no dispute about the petitioner being a major, “she was free to marry anyone she likes or live with anyone she likes“. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, (2010) The Supreme Court, in this case, held that Live-in relationships will also come under Domestic Violence Act 2005 . It is held that ‘not all live in relationships will amount to a relationship in the the nature of marriage to get the benefit of the Act of 2005. Masroor Ahmed v. Delhi (NCT) 2008 The Delhi HC in this case elucidated the various modes of dissolution of marriage under Muslim Law. The Hon’ble Court elaborated Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application), 1937. Ankush Narayan v. Janabai Court held that on adoption by a widow, the adopted son becomes the son of the deceased adoptive father and the position under the old Hindu law as regards ties in the adoptive family is not changed. Guradas v. Rasaranjan Adoption is made when the actual giving and taking had taken place and not when the religious ceremony is performed like Datta Homam. For a valid adoption, it would be necessary to bring on records that there has been an actual giving and taking ceremony. Jijabai v. Pathan Khan Where the father and mother had fallen out and the mother was living separately for over 20 years and was managing the affairs of her minor daughter the apex Court observed though the father was alive but he was not taking any interest in the affairs of the minor and should be treated as if non-existent, and, hence, the mother is the natural guardian of the minor’s person as well as property. Sitabai v. Ramchandra So there may be relationship by implication in the other cases also. The Supreme Court has also held that a son adopted by the widow of the deceased coparcener will also be a coparcener with the surviving coparceners of the deceased husband. R.Virupakshaiah v. Sarvamma & Anr Property inherited by a Hindu from his father, father’s father or father’s fathers’ father, is ancestral property. Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma & Ors. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act ,2005 did not provide for its retrospective effect. It was held that a daughter is entitled to equal property rights under Hindu Succession Amendment Act 2005 with retrospective effect. And it is immaterial whether she was born or her father was alive or not at the time of amendment in 2005 to Hindu Succession Act, which gave women equal right of inheritance. Dipo v. Wassan Singh & Others A person who has to inherit property from his immediate paternal ancestors up to 3 lines, holds it in coparcenary and to other relations he holds it and is entitled to hold it, as his absolute property. Hence, the property inherited by a person from any other relation becomes his separate property. Vaddeboyina Tulasamma v. Vaddeboyina Shesha Reddi, 1977 The Supreme Court in this case highlighted the Hindu female’s right to maintenance as a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and wife. The Bench comprising of Justice P.N. Bhagwati, Justice A.C. Gupta and Justice S.M. Fazal Ali held that Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 must be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object of the Act. This section makes female Hindu a full owner of a property, instead of a limited owner of the property. Mrs. Mary Roy Etc. v. State Of Kerala & Ors, 1986 The Supreme Court in this case held that Christian women are entitled to have an equal share in their father’s property. Till then, Christian women in Kerala were governed by the provisions under the 1916 Travancore-Kochi Christian Succession Act. Roxann Sharma v. Arun Sharma The Supreme Court in this case held that in a in a battle between estranged parents, for the custody of minor child, who has not completed five years of age, shall be allowed to remain with the mother. The Bench comprising of Justice Vikramajit Sen and Justice C. Nagappan held that in such cases child should not treated as a “chattel”. Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (1999) It is pertinent to note that sub-section (c) of Section 4 provides that a natural guardian means a guardian mentioned in Section 6. This definition section, however obviously in accordance with the rule of interpretation of statute, ought to be read subject to Section 6 being one of the basic provisions of the Act and it is this Section 6 which records that natural guardian of a Hindu minor, in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl, is the father and after him the mother. Dhanwanti Joshi v Madhav Unde (1998) The Supreme Court had the occasion to decide the custody of the child when he was more than 12 years old and decided that even though the father may have obtained custody from the US court, the best interests of the child demanded that the child be allowed to continue to stay with the mother in India who had brought up the child single handedly in India, subject to visitation rights of the father. Shatri vs. Muldas1966 Meaning of Hindu -Justice Gajendragadkar, Dr. Surajmani Stella Kujur v. Durga Charan Hansdah, AIR 2001 In this case, the Supreme Court described who is a “Hindu” for the purposes of the applicability of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Act, is, therefore, applicable to: “(1)All Hindus including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat, a Brahmo, Prarthana Samajist and an Arya Samajist (2) Budhists (3) Jains (4) Sikhs” Swaraj Garg v. K.M. Garg, AIR 1978 It is true that under the Hindu law, it is the duty of the husband to maintain his wife, but the wife is not under a corresponding duty to maintain her husband. This also is due to the fact that normally the husband is the wage earner. If, however, the wife also has her own income it will be taken into account and if her income is sufficient to maintain herself the husband will not be required to pay her any maintenance at all. There is no warrant in Hindu law to regard the Hindu wife as having no say in choosing the place of matrimonial home. Padmja Sharma v. Ratan Lal Sharma, AIR 2000 The obligation of a person to maintain his or her aged or infirm parents or daughter who is unmarried extends insofar as the parent or the unmarried daughter, as the case may be, is unable to maintain himself or herself out of his or her own earnings or other property. Gohar Begum v Suggi, (1960) The court held that in Muslim law, the mother is not a natural guardian even of her minor illegitimate children, but she is entitled to their custody. Mambandi v. Mutsaddi, (1918) The court held that a father’s right of guardianship exists even when the mother, or any other female, is entitled to the custody of the minor. The father has the right to control the education and religion of minor children, and their upbringing and their movement. So long as the father is alive, he is the sole and supreme guardian of his minor children. Vandana Shiva v. Jayanta Bandhopadhaya The Supreme Court has held that under certain circumstances, even when the father is alive mother can act as a natural guardian. The term ‘after’ used in Section 6(a) has been interpreted as ‘in absence of’ instead ‘after the life-time’.