Bombay High Court Says Reserve Bank Needs No Reason to Evict Tenants
The Bombay High Court on October 26, 2026 dismissed three writ petitions by the Reunion Group companies and upheld their eviction from the fourth floor of the Reserve Bank of India's Amar Building at P.M. Road, Fort, Mumbai, holding that a public authority does not have to cite or prove any reason to end the tenancy of an occupant who has no rent control protection. Justice Sandeep V. Marne added that, in any case, the Bank had proved a genuine security threat, and refused to sit as an appellate court over two concurrent findings. The tenants, whose occupation began in 1930 and who first agreed to look for alternate premises in 1961, were given four weeks of continued interim protection.
The title asks whether a public body can really evict tenants of decades without giving any reason. The Court's answer is yes, if the tenancy no longer enjoys rent control protection and the premises are covered by the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. The judgment reaches that answer after first rejecting every challenge to the security-threat case that the Bank chose to prove anyway.
Case at a Glance
Case: Munjee Nathoobhoy & Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India & Anr. (Writ Petition No. 2271 of 2014), heard with Reunion Private Limited v. Reserve Bank of India & Anr. (WP 2272 of 2014) and Reunion Engineering Company Private Limited v. Reserve Bank of India & Anr. (WP 2273 of 2014)
Citation: 2026:BHC-AS:43529
Bench: Justice Sandeep V. Marne, High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Civil Appellate Jurisdiction)
Reserved and pronounced: Reserved on October 7, 2026; pronounced on October 26, 2026
Challenged: Judgments dated January 23, 2014 of the Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Bombay in Misc. Appeal Nos. 52, 53 and 54 of 2013, confirming the Estate Officer's April 15, 2013 eviction orders under Section 5(1) of the Public Premises Act
Counsel: Mr. P.S. Colabawala for the petitioners; Dr. Virendra Tulzapurkar, Senior Advocate, for the Reserve Bank of India
Outcome: Petitions dismissed with no order as to costs; interim protection (running since March 6, 2014) continued for four weeks
Background: From a 1930 Tenancy to a 2013 Eviction Order
Amar Building was constructed in 1930. Munjee Nathoobhoy & Co. was inducted as a tenant of a portion of the fourth floor, and two group companies later came to occupy the same premises. The Reserve Bank bought the building in 1947 and was nationalised in 1949. In 1959 it sued the Reunion Group under the Bombay Rent Act, and on January 12, 1961 consent terms were recorded: the group surrendered part of the premises, the Bank agreed not to seek eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement under Section 13(1)(g), and the group agreed to find alternate accommodation. The Court noted that the petitioners continued in occupation and did not find alternate premises.
On July 17, 2009 the Bank terminated the tenancy and later moved the Estate Officer under the Public Premises Act, relying on security reports of February 28, 2002 (Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs) and January 20, 2005 (Additional Commissioner of Police, Mumbai). The Estate Officer formed an opinion on September 16, 2009 and issued a show cause notice on September 22, 2009 under Section 4. After evidence, eviction was ordered on April 15, 2013 under Section 5(1). The City Civil Court dismissed the appeals on January 23, 2014, and this Court granted interim stay on March 6, 2014.
What the Petitioners Argued
The show cause notice rested on an opinion of 2009 formed from stale 2002 and 2005 reports, so its foundation was void, relying on Mine Manager, Manganese Ore (India) Ltd. v. Shyam s/o Kunjilal Yadav.
The security reports were admitted without examining their authors, which breached natural justice, relying on Sait Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. v. The Workmen and Nandini J. Shah v. Life Insurance Corporation of India.
The Bank, an instrumentality of the State, cannot act arbitrarily and needs a valid reason, relying on Jiwan Dass v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and the Government of India guidelines of May 30, 2002 (Banatwala & Co. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India).
Most security recommendations were never implemented, a third report of 2010 was produced selectively, and bona fide requirement could not be a ground given the 1961 consent terms.
What the Reserve Bank Argued
Two concurrent findings on security threat and bona fide requirement cannot be re-appreciated under Article 227; the petitions are an appeal in disguise.
Once the Bank perceives a security threat, it is justified in terminating the tenancy, and the 2002 guidelines have no statutory force and bar only commercial motives.
No ground need even be shown, because rent control protection stands withdrawn by Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Vita; a tenancy ends by Section 106 notice under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and occupation then becomes unauthorised, relying on Bank of Maharashtra v. Gunwanti Kashinath Zarkar.
What the High Court Held and Why
Issue 1: Was the Show Cause Notice Void for Relying on Stale Reports?
No. The Court held there is no separate stage of formation of opinion under the Public Premises Act. Under Section 4, the Estate Officer may issue a show cause notice merely on information that a person is in unauthorised occupation, so it was not even necessary to record an opinion, and the correctness of that opinion cannot be questioned in appeal. Only the findings in the final eviction order can be challenged.
Mine Manager Distinguished
In Mine Manager the entire foundation of the notice, that the occupant's service had ended, was found to be factually wrong because he had never been in service. Here, the Court said, the basis of loss of employment cannot be compared with the basis of security perception, and there was no foundational error.
The Delay Argument
The Court held that passage of time does not make the proposal void. The Intelligence Bureau report covered the Bank's 26-storey New Central Office Building, 3-storey Main Building and 6-storey Amar Building, and shifting non-Bank offices from Amar Building was one of its 14 recommendations. The Bank possibly allowed the petitioners to continue because the report only asked for exploring the feasibility of shifting. A second report from the Additional Commissioner of Police flagged unregulated entry of visitors to non-Bank offices, and a third report of July 31, 2010 from the Bank's own Protection and Security Branch again recommended eviction, noting about 650 employees in non-Bank premises and about 150 visitors a day. Other occupants such as MTNL and David & Co. have already moved out.
It cannot be contended that the delay on the part of the RBI in acting on the two security reports would enure to the benefit of the Petitioners in any manner.
Issue 2: Were the Security Reports Wrongly Admitted Without Examining Their Authors?
The Court agreed with the City Civil Court that they were rightly admitted. The reports were confidential, yet copies were given to the petitioners, who cross-examined the Bank's witness at length and also dealt with the reports in written submissions.
Natural Justice Was Observed
The Court said Sait Tarajee Khimchand only holds that mere marking of an exhibit does not dispense with proof, and Bareilly Electricity Supply holds that even where the Evidence Act does not apply, tribunals cannot rely on unproven documents. Here the Bank's security officer, who had received the reports, gave evidence about them, so it could not be said there was no evidence.
Hearsay in Quasi-Judicial Proceedings
Relying on State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, the Court said there is no absolute bar on hearsay in quasi-judicial proceedings if it is logically probative, credible and has a reasonable nexus to the issue. The evidence was intended only to establish the Bank's threat perception and the necessity of eviction.
Limits of Cross-Examination
This is not a criminal trial to apply strict rules of evidence.
The Court held that the petitioners could cross-examine the Bank's official only to show that the reports do not disclose a security threat from their presence. They could not cross-examine the security agencies' officers to prove that there is actually no threat, since recommendations of security agencies and the public authority's perception of threat are different concepts. It also noted that Nandini J. Shah concerned alleged subletting where the onus was on the landlord, and Tirandaz Subha Niketan CHSL concerned a stop-work notice near a naval establishment, neither of which applies to specific recommendations to remove non-Bank entities from Amar Building.
Issue 3: Does the Bank Have to Give or Prove Any Reason at All?
No, held the Court, though it found the security ground established anyway. Occupation of public premises is lawful only under express authority, and once that authority is determined, occupation becomes unauthorised.
Section 2(g) and the Words "For Any Reason Whatsoever"
Section 2(g) treats occupation as unauthorised when the authority to occupy has been determined "for any reason whatsoever". The Court read this to cover cases where authority is determined during its subsistence, such as a fixed-term lease cut short for alleged subletting, where the ground must be stated and proved. It does not require reasons where there is no fixed tenure and the occupant is simply a monthly tenant under a misconception that Rent Act protection applies.
Vita, Jiwan Dass and Gunwanti Zarkar
Once it was declared in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Vita that rent laws do not protect premises covered by the Public Premises Act, the petitioners' occupancy became a simple monthly tenancy terminable under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Court said Jiwan Dass militates against the petitioners because the Supreme Court there held that reading a requirement of reasonable and justifiable grounds into the power would make the provisions ultra vires and put the tenant on a higher pedestal than a statutory tenant. It also relied on Bank of Maharashtra v. Gunwanti Kashinath Zarkar for the position that the owner need not establish any ground, including bona fide requirement.
The Maharashtra Rent Control Act Comparison
The Court gave a practical illustration. Under Section 3(1)(b) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, entities such as companies with share capital above Rs. 1 crore, banks and public sector undertakings are excluded from the Act, so a private landlord can end their tenancy by notice without citing any reason, though it must file an ejectment suit. A public authority has the swifter route of the Public Premises Act. Requiring it to justify a reason would be "wholly incongruous, absurd" and would place public premises on a higher pedestal than private premises.
Issue 4: The 2002 Guidelines, Arbitrariness and Article 227
The Court held that the Government of India guidelines of May 30, 2002 have no statutory force and in any case do not help the petitioners, because there was nothing to show that the Bank would rent out the premises or give them to its employees, so the action was not commercially motivated. Banatwala & Co. concerned the continued application of state rent laws to standard rent and essential services, and it would be "too adventurous" for the petitioners to suggest they still enjoy Rent Act protection against eviction. The Court also found no arbitrariness, saying the Bank acted on concrete material and not on whims.
This Court cannot sit as an Appellate Court over the findings recorded by the Estate Officer and by the Principal Judge by re-appreciating the evidence.
The Final Order
The Court observed that the petitioners had remained in the premises for 13 years after the April 15, 2013 eviction order, aided by pending litigation, and that they had undertaken to look for alternate premises as far back as 1961. It concluded that the Bank, though not required to do so, had established its requirement of the premises for security purposes, and that the petitioners had not shown the threat perception to be totally unfounded.
Time has come for them to vacate the possession of public premises.
The writ petitions were dismissed with no order as to costs. On the petitioners' request, the interim protection that has been running since March 6, 2014 was continued for four weeks.
What It Means Going Forward
For public bodies, the Public Premises Act route does not require stating or proving a ground where the occupant enjoys no rent control protection and the tenancy has been terminated by notice under Section 106.
A show cause notice under Section 4 can be issued on mere information, and the Estate Officer's opinion at that stage is not a separate step open to appeal.
In eviction proceedings before an Estate Officer, confidential security reports can be proved through the officer of the authority that received them, and occupants may cross-examine on the authority's threat perception but not on whether the threat is real.
Government guidelines against commercial-motive evictions do not create enforceable rights, and Article 227 jurisdiction will not be used to re-appreciate evidence where the findings are concurrent and not perverse.
Tenants of public premises who assume Rent Act protection should note that continued occupation during years of litigation does not create any right to remain.
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Frequently Asked Questions
Q1. What did the Bombay High Court decide in this case? On October 26, 2026 Justice Sandeep V. Marne dismissed writ petitions by Munjee Nathoobhoy & Company Pvt. Ltd., Reunion Private Limited and Reunion Engineering Company Private Limited, upholding their eviction from the Reserve Bank of India's Amar Building in Mumbai under the Public Premises Act.
Q2. Does a public authority need a reason to evict a tenant from public premises? Not where rent control protection is unavailable and the tenancy has been terminated by notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Court held no reason needs to be cited or established, though it also found the Bank had proved a genuine security threat.
Q3. Why did the Court reject the argument that the security reports were stale? Section 4 of the Public Premises Act allows a show cause notice on mere information, with no separate formation of opinion. The Court also noted that three reports recommended shifting non-Bank occupants, including one of 2010, and that delay in acting does not benefit the occupants.
Q4. Was it a problem that the security reports' authors were not examined? No. The Court held the Bank's security officer could prove receipt of the reports and the Bank's threat perception, the occupants received copies and cross-examined him, and the Evidence Act does not strictly apply to such summary proceedings.
Q5. What relief did the tenants get? No order as to costs, and the interim protection operating since March 6, 2014 was continued for four weeks after the judgment.
Keywords: Bombay High Court RBI eviction, Reserve Bank of India Amar Building eviction, Public Premises Act eviction, Section 106 Transfer of Property Act public premises, Justice Sandeep Marne eviction, security threat eviction public premises, Life Insurance Corporation v. Vita, 2026:BHC-AS:43529
Case Title: Munjee Nathoobhoy & Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India & Anr.; Reunion Private Limited v. Reserve Bank of India & Anr.; Reunion Engineering Company Private Limited v. Reserve Bank of India & Anr.
Case No.: Writ Petition Nos. 2271, 2272 and 2273 of 2014
Citation: 2026:BHC-AS:43529
Bench: Justice Sandeep V. Marne
Read the judgment: Download the Bombay High Court judgment (PDF)
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