You Filed the Suit. The Trust Is Being Mismanaged. The Court Still Can’t Act: Supreme Court on Section 92 CPC and the Receiver Ban (2026 INSC 1010)

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Picture a school run by a public charitable trust. Two members of the public believe the trustees are running it into the ground. They file a suit, and because a suit against a public charity needs the court’s permission first, they file an application for leave along with it. Weeks go by. The alleged mismanagement does not stop. So they ask the judge for something urgent: appoint a receiver and put someone neutral in charge.

On 18 September 2026, the Supreme Court said the judge cannot do that. Not because the case is weak and not because the trust is blameless, but because in the eyes of the law there is no suit yet.

This blog breaks down S. Panchalingu & Ors. v. People’s Education Trust (R) & Ors. (2026 INSC 1010) in plain language, walks through the five reasons the Court gave, and shows what lawyers should do differently when they draft a Section 92 case.

The Case at a Glance

Case: S. Panchalingu & Ors. v. People’s Education Trust (R) & Ors.
Citation: 2026 INSC 1010, Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 25577-25579 of 2025
Bench: Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Manmohan, with the judgment authored by Justice Manmohan
Decided on: 18 September 2026
Question of law: Can a civil court, seized of a plaint under Section 92 CPC along with an application for leave to sue, pass protective or preservatory interim orders while the leave application is still pending?
Answer: No. The appeals were dismissed, with one important clarification about granting leave without notice in urgent cases.

How the Dispute Reached the Supreme Court

The trouble began in Mandya, Karnataka. On 2 May 2025, the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mandya, invoked Order XL Rule 1(a) CPC and constituted an ad hoc committee of the existing trustees to run the day-to-day affairs of People’s Education Trust until further directions.

The Karnataka High Court set that order aside on 25 June 2025. It reaffirmed its earlier view that a Section 92 suit stays “stillborn” until leave is granted, so the trial court has no jurisdiction to pass interlocutory orders in the meantime. The appellants then came to the Supreme Court.

A Question That Had Split the High Courts

Before this judgment, High Courts across the country were pulling in opposite directions.

Protective jurisdiction exists pending leave: Allahabad (including the Full Bench in Muhammad Ali Khan, 1945), Bombay (Bai Sakri), Kerala (Sulaiman) and Madras (N. Anandan and R. Shanmugam).
Protective jurisdiction is excluded: Orissa (Kintali China Jaganadham) and Karnataka (Shree Beereshwara Swamy Devaru Temple).

The Supreme Court has now settled the debate in favour of the Orissa and Karnataka view.

What Each Side Argued

The Appellants (Dr. Aditya Sondhi, Senior Advocate)

A court seized of a Section 92 application cannot be a “mute spectator” until leave is granted.
Section 94 read with Order XL Rule 1 allows a receiver for “any property”, “before or after decree”. The phrase “in a suit” is missing, which suggests a wider power.
Section 141 CPC applies suit procedure to miscellaneous proceedings, and Rule 16-A of the Karnataka Civil Rules of Practice treats a leave application as an independent and substantive application.
Section 151 CPC preserves the inherent power to make orders necessary for the ends of justice (relying on Manohar Lal Chopra).
A receiver is the “hand of the Court”, so the appointment is protective, not adjudicatory, and courts should prefer the reading that preserves jurisdiction.

The Respondents (Mr. Raghavendra S. Srivatsa, Senior Advocate, and Mr. Amit Pai)

Leave is a threshold step where no rights are adjudicated, so a separate registration number does not turn it into a substantive proceeding.
“Before or after decree” presupposes a pending suit, and the argument built on the missing words “in a suit” is a logical fallacy.
Section 92 says “having obtained the leave of the Court”, unlike Section 91 which only says “with the leave of the Court”. Parliament also did not accept the Law Commission’s 54th Report recommendation to align Section 91, which shows Section 92 is sui generis.
Muhammad Ali Khan dealt with a private trust, where Section 92 has no application.
The trial court’s order was cryptic, and the receiver application was filed on the eve of the summer vacation while Order XXXIX applications were already pending.

Five Locks on the Gate: Why the Court Said No

The Court did not rest on one reason. It turned five separate locks, and the appellants needed to break all of them.

Lock 1: The Suit Is Not Born Until Leave Is Granted

The Court began with history. Before the 1976 amendment, a Section 92 suit needed the written consent of the Advocate-General. Parliament replaced that executive step with a judicial one: the plaintiffs must have obtained the leave of the Court. That made leave a mandatory pre-condition to institution, not a formality.

The Court also called Section 92 both a “protective shield” for trusts against vexatious litigation and a “remedial sword” for beneficiaries against real mismanagement. Consideration of leave is only a threshold proceeding. Until it ends in a grant, there is no pending proceeding in which an interlocutory application can be entertained.

The Court also pointed out that the CPC has no provision like Section 92. Even other leave provisions, such as the one on public nuisance, do not use the words “having obtained”.

Lock 2: Supplemental Proceedings Need a Parent Proceeding

Section 94 speaks of supplemental proceedings, and the Court held that such proceedings presuppose an underlying proceeding. Without leave, there is no lis before the Court and therefore no jurisdiction to invoke supplemental powers.

Order XL Rule 1(a) tells the same story. The words “whether before or after decree” assume a validly instituted suit, since there cannot be a decree without one. The Court described the appellants’ “omitted words” argument as the logical fallacy of simple conversion, borrowing the discussion from H.M. Seervai’s treatise.

Lock 3: Section 141 Is Not a Skeleton Key

Section 141 only applies the Code’s procedure “as far as it can be made applicable”. Agreeing with the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Thresia v. Xavier, the Supreme Court held that it covers procedural matters and not substantive rights.

Here, both the safeguards of Section 92 and the appointment of a receiver affect substantive rights. So Section 141 cannot be used to override them, and even if it could, the basic pre-condition of Order XL, a validly instituted suit, would still be missing.

Lock 4: Inherent Power and “Preserve Jurisdiction” Cannot Override the Code

The appellants’ fallback was Section 151. The Court answered that inherent powers and the rule of preferring the construction that preserves jurisdiction work only where jurisdiction already exists. They cannot be used against the express provisions of the Code.

It relied on three ideas: the special provision (Section 92) prevails over the general one (Section 151) under the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant; interim orders are meant to aid the final relief in a suit, not a proceeding the court cannot yet entertain; and where a power must be exercised in a particular manner, it must be exercised in that manner alone or not at all.

Lock 5: A Receiver Is Not a Harmless Caretaker

The appellants stressed that a receiver merely preserves property. The Court disagreed. In a public trust, it said, the appointment of a receiver is intrusive and dislodges the existing management, which defeats the very purpose of requiring leave, namely protection from litigation.

If leave is finally refused after a receiver has already taken charge, the trust’s management would have been prejudiced for nothing.
Accepting the appellants’ argument would mean that, before leave, the only interim order a court could pass is the appointment of a receiver, a distinction with no legislative basis.
Muhammad Ali Khan could not help the appellants because it concerned a private waqf alal-aulad, to which Section 92 does not apply.

The Court added that a court which lacks jurisdiction cannot acquire it merely by how the relief is described.

The Emergency Exit: Leave Can Be Granted Without Notice

The judgment does not leave a public charity’s property defenceless in a real emergency. The Court recognised that urgent interim measures, including ex parte temporary injunctions, may be needed to protect a charity’s property in suits under Section 92. Where the facts show compelling urgency, notice to the proposed defendants before granting leave is not indispensable.

There are conditions attached:

Notice ordinarily should precede leave, unless that is impracticable.
The Court must record cogent, prima facie reasons in writing for granting leave ex parte, and must exercise utmost care and caution.
A suit filed after leave granted without notice is not bad in law. The defendants can apply for revocation of leave, and that application must be decided on merits.
Once leave is granted on such reasons, the Court retains power to pass interim orders beyond the mere appointment of a receiver.

The Holding in Plain Words

A civil court that has a Section 92 plaint and a leave application before it cannot pass protective or preservatory interim orders until the leave application is disposed of. For compelling reasons recorded in writing, notice before granting leave may be dispensed with.

What This Means in Practice

If You Are Drafting for the Petitioners

Treat the leave application as the main event. Do not lead with an Order XL or Section 151 application and hope the court will act before leave.
Plead the three conditions of maintainability clearly: a public trust of a charitable or religious nature, a breach of trust or need for directions, and reliefs falling within Section 92(1).
If the danger is real and immediate, put the urgency inside the leave application itself, supported by documents, and ask for leave without notice with reasons the court can record.
File early. The Respondents in this case used the timing of the receiver application against the appellants.

If You Are Defending the Trust

Take the maintainability objection at the very first hearing: no leave, no interlocutory jurisdiction.
If leave was granted ex parte, move promptly for revocation and highlight any absence of cogent reasons.
Point to the Court’s description of a receiver as intrusive when resisting any management takeover.

A Word of Caution

The Court took care to distinguish Section 92 from other leave provisions in the Code. Be careful before stretching this judgment to Section 91, Order XXXIII or other provisions. Each statute has to be read on its own wording.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

1. Can a civil court appoint a receiver before granting leave under Section 92 CPC?

No. In S. Panchalingu v. People’s Education Trust (2026 INSC 1010), the Supreme Court held that a court with a Section 92 plaint and a pending leave application cannot pass protective or preservatory interim orders, including the appointment of a receiver, until leave is granted.

2. What did the Supreme Court decide in S. Panchalingu v. People’s Education Trust?

The Court dismissed the appeals against the Karnataka High Court’s judgment, which had set aside the Mandya court’s order forming an ad hoc committee of trustees. It held that leave is a threshold requirement, that Order XL, Section 94, Section 141 and Section 151 CPC cannot be used before leave, and that a receiver in a public trust is an intrusive measure.

3. Can leave under Section 92 CPC be granted without notice to the trustees?

Yes, in cases of compelling urgency. The Court clarified that notice before leave is not indispensable when the facts demand urgent relief, but the reasons must be recorded in writing and the power must be used with great caution. The defendants can later seek revocation of the leave.

4. Why can’t Section 151 CPC or Order XL Rule 1 be used before leave is granted?

Because both operate only where jurisdiction already exists. Order XL Rule 1 presupposes a validly instituted suit, since it speaks of appointing a receiver before or after decree. Section 151 is a general provision and cannot override the special safeguard in Section 92.

5. Who can file a suit under Section 92 CPC and why is leave needed?

A suit for a breach of a public charitable or religious trust can be filed by the Advocate-General, or by two or more persons having an interest in the trust who have obtained the leave of the Court. Leave is required to shield public trusts and trustees from vexatious and wasteful litigation, while still allowing genuine complaints to proceed.

Turn Judgments Like This Into a Litigation Career

Notice what decided this case. It was not a dramatic argument on the facts of the trust. It was a question of sequence: which application to file, when, and on what pleaded foundation. Lawyers who understand procedure at this level, and who can put it on paper in a clean plaint, a sharp leave application or a tight reply on maintainability, are the ones trust litigation clients look for.

Temples, mutts, charitable schools, hospitals and religious endowments generate steady work under Section 92, and every one of those files is won or lost in the drafting.

If you are a law student or a young lawyer who wants that edge, our Advanced Legal Drafting 6.0 course is built around practical legal drafting, the skill that separates a lawyer who knows the law from one who can put it to work. Explore the course, see the syllabus and register here: Advanced Legal Drafting 6.0 by Into Legal World.

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Read the Full Judgment

Download the official judgment PDF (S. Panchalingu & Ors. v. People’s Education Trust (R) & Ors., 2026 INSC 1010): Download the Judgment PDF.

You can also view the judgment on Google Drive: Open the Judgment on Google Drive.

Keywords

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