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“Mudslinging”: Supreme Court Says Lose in Singapore, Lose in India, and Adopts “Transnational Issue Estoppel” in a ₹1,400 Crore SIAC Award Fight (2026 INSC 298)

Sep 21
15 min read

Updated: Sep 22

Suppose you lose your challenge to an arbitral award at the seat of arbitration. Can you simply walk into an Indian court and argue the same points again, this time dressed up as ‘public policy’? On 25 March 2026, in Nagaraj V. Mylandla v. PI Opportunities Fund-I and others (2026 INSC 298), the Supreme Court said no. It called the attempt a ‘mudslinging effort’, added fresh costs, and gave Indian arbitration law its first ruling on the doctrine of transnational issue estoppel.

Because the Mylandlas raised a whole basket of objections, this post is organised like a charge sheet. First the background, then the doctrine, then each objection and what became of it.

The Case Card

  • Case: Nagaraj V. Mylandla v. PI Opportunities Fund-I and others, Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 31866-68 of 2025, heard with SLP (Civil) Nos. 31945-31947 of 2025 (2026 INSC 298, reportable).

  • Bench: Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice K. Vinod Chandran. The judgment was authored by Justice Sanjay Kumar.

  • Decided on: 25 March 2026, New Delhi.

  • What was in issue: enforcement in India of a foreign arbitral award dated 05.07.2024 (SIAC Arbitration No. 098 of 2022, seated in Singapore), which the Madras High Court declared enforceable and deemed a decree under Section 49 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

  • Result: Special leave petitions dismissed with further costs of ₹25,00,000 to be paid by the Mylandlas jointly to each of the Investors.

The Promise That Started It All

Financial Software and Systems Private Limited (FSSPL), Chennai, is a digital payment services company with two divisions, CashTech and PayTech. Its business covers real-time electronic transaction processing, ATMs, point of sale terminals, ATM sharing between banks and international and domestic interchanges. Nagaraj V. Mylandla, Sharada Mylandla and Rudhraapathy J. are its promoters.

On 10.10.2014, three groups of investors, PI Opportunities Fund-I (PIOF), Millenna FVCI Limited (formerly NEA FVCI Limited) and NYLIM Jacob Ballas India (FVCI) III LLC with NYLIM Jacob Ballas India Fund III LLC (together ‘the Investors’), bought into FSSPL under a Share Acquisition and Share Holders Agreement (SASHA). PIOF held 20.14%, Millenna 18.97% and the two Nylim entities 12.65% together. The heart of the SASHA was Clause 19, titled ‘Exit’:

  • The target: FSSPL and its promoters would make efforts for a Qualified Initial Public Offering (QIPO) on or before 31.03.2016.

  • Clause 19.1: if no QIPO happened, an Investor could require FSSPL and the promoters to find a buyer for its shares at or above a defined ‘exit price’ (a secondary sale).

  • Clause 19.2: if no secondary sale took place, the Investors could require FSSPL to buy back their shares.

  • Clause 19.3: failing both, the Investors could cause an IPO.

  • Clause 19.6: if all of that failed and FSSPL was in material breach, the Investors could implement a ‘strategic sale’ or merger.

  • Clauses 24.4 and 24.6: failure to provide an exit was itself a ‘material breach’, after which the Investors could choose a strategic sale, a buy-back, or termination of the promoters’ rights (but not their obligations).

  • Clauses 29.5 and 29.6: no waiver unless in writing, and all remedies were cumulative and not alternative.

When the Exit Never Came

  • 31.03.2016: the QIPO cut-off passes without a listing. Secondary sale notices follow on 01.04.2016 (Millenna) and 26.04.2016 (Nylim I and II).

  • 2017 to 2022: FSSPL’s Board approves a dual plan to cause an IPO and explore private equity funding, but nothing positive emerges. The Nylim entities repeat their request on 18.09.2020, and PIOF on 05.01.2021.

  • 11.04.2022: the Investors issue notices of material breach, notices of strategic sale, and a notice terminating the Mylandlas’ rights under the SASHA. The Mylandlas deny the contents the same day.

  • 14.04.2022 and 21.04.2022: notices of arbitration are served.

The Award: Damages at the Exit Price

A three-member tribunal, Ms. Koh Swee Yen, SC (presiding), Mr. David Joseph, KC and Mr. Ramakrishnan Viraraghavan, SC, delivered a unanimous award on 05.07.2024 under the SIAC Rules. The SASHA was governed by Indian law, with Singapore as the seat. The tribunal held:

  • Clause 19 imposed an absolute obligation on FSSPL and its promoters to provide an exit.

  • The valuation date for the exit price was 18.09.2020, the date of the Nylim notice. The exit prices were ₹6,614 million for PIOF, ₹2,804 million for Millenna, ₹777 million for Nylim I and ₹1,093 million for Nylim II. Together that is ₹11,288 million before interest and costs.

  • Simple interest at 5.33% per annum would run from 01.07.2021 to the date of the award, and post-award at the same rate, along with costs.

  • If the damages were not paid within 90 days, the Investors could proceed to a strategic sale, and the damages would stand reduced by the net sale proceeds. If paid, the Investors would cooperate in surrendering their shares.

  • The Specific Relief Act, 1963 was no bar, because the strategic sale would arise only if the damages went unpaid.

On 22.08.2024, in response to the Mylandlas’ own application, the tribunal issued a Memorandum of Correction and Interpretation. It clarified that the Investors’ termination of the promoters’ rights fell away once the main relief, the strategic sale option in default of damages, was granted, since the two remedies were alternatives.

Two Rounds the Mylandlas Had Already Lost

Round one, Singapore. The Mylandlas challenged the award in OA No. 1033 of 2024 before the General Division of the Singapore High Court on two fair hearing grounds: that the tribunal ignored their ‘waiver defence’ and their ‘buy-back defence’. The Singapore High Court dismissed the challenge on 21.02.2025. Among other findings, it held the tribunal need not address every defence expressly and that the alleged buy-back was a disguised attack on the tribunal’s view of Clause 19.1. That order was appealable to the Singapore Court of Appeal, but the Mylandlas did not appeal.

Round two, Madras. The Investors then sought enforcement under Sections 47 to 49 in Arbitration O.P. (Comm. Div.) Nos. 285, 452 and 453 of 2024. On 22.09.2025, a Judge of the Madras High Court held the award enforceable and deemed it a decree, with liberty to execute. He took note that the award visited a liability of more than ₹1,400 crore on the Mylandlas, gave them several days of hearing, and still imposed costs of ₹25 lakh payable to each of the Investors for ‘deliberately delaying the inevitable’. He also applied ‘transnational issue estoppel’ to issues the Singapore High Court had already decided.

One Bite or Two? Reconciling Vijay Karia and PASL Wind Solutions

The Mylandlas leaned on PASL Wind Solutions v. GE Power Conversion India (2021) 7 SCC 1, which says that by choosing a neutral foreign seat, parties get ‘two bites at the cherry’: a challenge at the seat on that country’s grounds, and resistance to enforcement on the Section 48 grounds. The Investors relied on Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi SRL (2020) 11 SCC 1, which says the scheme of Section 50 gives only ‘one bite at the cherry’ against an order enforcing a foreign award, since an appeal lies only against an order refusing enforcement.

The Court reconciled the two. The observations were made in different contexts and can stand independently. Vijay Karia also warns that the Supreme Court’s Article 136 jurisdiction should not be used to defeat the legislative policy, and that it will interfere with enforcement of a foreign award only to settle the law on a new or unique point or in an exceptional case of blatant disregard of Section 48. That is the gate through which this case came: the Court took it up to deal with transnational issue estoppel, on which it noted it had never before ruled.

The Doctrine in Plain Words: Transnational Issue Estoppel

Issue estoppel is a familiar cousin of res judicata: once an issue has been finally decided between the same parties, the loser cannot raise it again in later proceedings. Transnational issue estoppel carries that idea across borders, so that an issue decided by the seat court cannot be reopened before the enforcement court. The Court traced the roots in Gopal Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar, Hope Plantations v. Taluk Land Board and Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar, and then looked abroad.

  • The usual test: the earlier judgment must come from a court of competent jurisdiction and be final and conclusive on the merits, the parties must be the same, and the issue must be the same (Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner and Keller, and The Sennar (No. 2)). Good Challenger Navegante v. Metalexportimport adds that there must be a full contestation and a clear decision, and that estoppel must work justice and not injustice.

  • The Singapore Court of Appeal: in Republic of India v. Deutsche Telekom AG [2023] SGCA(I) 10, the Court held that the doctrine applies to a seat court’s decision. It also noted that the doctrine does not arise where the enforcement court’s own public policy is in issue, because that policy was not decided by the seat court, and it listed exceptions taken from Merck Sharp & Dohme v. Merck KGaA.

  • Other courts: English decisions such as Diag Human v. Czech Republic and Stati v. Kazakhstan apply the doctrine but keep public policy separate, and the Singapore High Court in Sacofa v. Super Sea Cable Networks distinguishes forum-connected issues from forum-neutral ones.

Against that background, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine effectively curbs the propensity of parties to relitigate settled factual issues just because they are before a different court in a different country. It narrows the enforcement court’s interference with an award that has already passed muster with the seat court, and it adds to the efficiency of arbitration. The Court also accepted the limit set by the Singapore Court of Appeal: a challenge on the ground of India’s public policy stands on a different footing, and the enforcement court must still examine it against Indian parameters. What it cannot do is a merits-based evaluation, or let a party whose factual contentions the seat court rejected seek a review in the guise of a public policy attack.

The rule of thumb from the judgment: an enforcement court may test an award against the public policy of India, but it may not reopen facts that the seat court has settled, and a factual dispute does not become a public policy ground merely by being relabelled.

The Charge Sheet: Six Objections, Six Rejections

Objection 1: “Surrendering shares against damages is a buy-back in disguise”

The Mylandlas argued that the Investors’ surrender of shares on payment of damages was in substance a buy-back violating Sections 66 to 68 of the Companies Act, 2013, and that because FSSPL was jointly liable under the award, it could be made to fund the exit indirectly. The Court disagreed on several counts. The seat court had dealt with this at length and rejected it. The distinction between surrender and buy-back drawn by the Madras High Court was ‘unexceptionable’. It was the Investors who offered to surrender their shares, to pre-empt an unjust enrichment argument. The award does not say to whom the shares are to be surrendered, and if the Mylandlas themselves pay, the shares would go to them, which would raise their holding and be neither a buy-back by FSSPL nor a reduction of capital. Finally, transnational issue estoppel barred reopening the matter. The Court added that the ground would have been open only if the seat court had held the transaction to be a buy-back but stopped short of granting relief on that footing.

Objection 2: “The Investors elected two remedies at once”

The Mylandlas said Clause 24.6 offered three alternatives, strategic sale, buy-back or termination of rights, and that the Investors invoked two together. The Court called this a question of interpreting the SASHA, which the tribunal had answered and which a merits-based review under Section 48 cannot disturb. It also read the clauses together. Termination of the promoters’ rights under Clause 24.6(c) was not itself an exit option. It was an interim measure to protect FSSPL’s value as a going concern while the Investors pursued their exit, and the 11.04.2022 email did not show an intention to take over the company. Once damages were awarded, that termination fell away, as the correction order recorded.

Objection 3: “The correction order breached natural justice”

The Mylandlas claimed the tribunal decided something afresh in its correction order. The Court found no merit. All the relevant clauses had been considered, and the correction was delivered at the Mylandlas’ own behest and clarified the position in their favour. It could not be treated as a fresh decision.

Objection 4: “The award violates the Specific Relief Act, 1963”

The Mylandlas relied on Katta Sujatha Reddy v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects (2023) 1 SCC 355 and Annamalai v. Vasanthi (2025 INSC 1267) to argue that the 2018 amendments to the Specific Relief Act are prospective. The Court held that reliance on Katta Sujatha Reddy was misplaced because that decision was reviewed and recalled by a 3-Judge Bench in Siddamsetty Infra Projects v. Katta Sujatha Reddy (2024) 20 SCC 140, and that Annamalai turned on its own facts and could not override the larger Bench. The objection had been raised before the tribunal and rejected. The Mylandlas did not raise it before the seat court, though that court examined it anyway and found no violation. So no merits review was permissible, and it could not be reopened as a camouflaged public policy plea.

Objection 5: “A strategic sale is specific performance in disguise”

The Court looked at what the award actually granted. The substantial relief was damages at the exit price. The strategic sale was an alternative that would arise only if the damages were not paid, so it could not be called specific performance of a strategic sale. The Investors, being venture capital investors, wanted returns and not control of FSSPL or its transfer to third parties, and the strategic sale was only a last resort in Clause 19.6.

Objection 6: “Enforcing only against the promoters is a trick”

Since the award made several parties jointly and severally liable, the Court held that the Investors were free to choose whom to enforce against. They explained that they left FSSPL alone to preserve its value as a going concern, because a strategic sale was their fallback, and the Court saw no clandestine or improper motive.

Objections that fell earlier

Before the Madras High Court, the Mylandlas had also pressed a waiver defence (defeated by Clause 29.5, which requires waiver in writing), an unauthorised delegation of power to Archit Mylandla, a limitation of liability argument under Clause 22, and an allegation of fraud through concealment of documents. The High Court rejected each, and the fraud plea in particular for not having been raised before the tribunal or the seat court. Before the Supreme Court, the Court noted that certain grounds in the special leave petitions were not even argued, and it treated them as discarded.

The Door the Court Left Ajar: Section 44(b)

While summarising the statutory scheme of Part II, Chapter I of the Act, the Court flagged a question it did not decide. Section 44(b) makes a New York Convention award ‘foreign’ only if it is made in a territory notified by the Central Government as reciprocating. The Court observed that only about 48 to 50 of the 172 signatory countries have been notified, and that this sits awkwardly with Article III of the Convention, which bars more onerous conditions for foreign awards than for domestic ones. Singapore is a notified country, so the point did not arise. The Court expressly left it open for an appropriate case.

The Final Order and the Price of a Second Round

  • The special leave petitions are dismissed, and the Madras High Court’s order of 22.09.2025 declaring the award enforceable and deeming it a decree stands.

  • The Court called the effort a ‘mudslinging’ exercise, borrowing that description from Vijay Karia, and held the Mylandlas richly deserving of further costs.

  • Further costs of ₹25,00,000 are to be paid by the Mylandlas jointly to each of the Investors, on top of the ₹25 lakh already imposed by the Madras High Court.

  • The Investors will pursue execution by filing a separate execution petition, as the High Court permitted.

A Note on the Record Before You Cite This Judgment

  • The ₹1,400 crore figure: this comes from the Madras High Court’s remark, recorded in paragraph 39, that the award visited a liability of more than ₹1,400 crore. The Supreme Court’s summary of the award lists four exit prices totalling ₹11,288 million, and the judgment does not itemise how interest and costs bring the figure higher.

  • Public policy under Sections 34 and 48: the Supreme Court said the Madras High Court was not correct in treating public policy under Section 48 as narrower than under Section 34, but found no error resulted. This is consistent with Vijay Karia, which treats the two as identical after the 2016 amendment.

  • Quoted text of Section 48: the extract of Explanation 1 in paragraph 47 reads ‘section 75 of section 81’, which appears to be a typographical slip. Check the bare act, which says ‘or’.

  • Costs: the judgment says ₹25,00,000 is payable jointly ‘to each of the Investors’ without spelling out the number of payees or a total, so calculate carefully before quoting an aggregate.

  • Case numbers: the matters are special leave petitions and were not converted into numbered appeals in the reported copy, so cite SLP (C) Nos. 31866-68 of 2025 and 31945-31947 of 2025 with the neutral citation 2026 INSC 298.

What Lawyers and Law Students Should Take From This Judgment

  • Treat the seat challenge as the main event. Whatever the seat court decides on a point becomes very hard to reopen in India. Raise every ground there, and think hard before choosing not to appeal an adverse seat court ruling, as the Mylandlas did.

  • Public policy is narrow and not a second hearing. Section 48(2)(b) and its Explanations allow limited review of fundamental policy of Indian law and basic notions of justice or morality, not a review on the merits. Plead a genuine legal violation, not a rewrite of the facts.

  • Read the clauses together. The tribunal and the courts all leaned on reading Clause 19, Clause 24 and Clause 29 as one scheme, calling the SASHA a carefully crafted agreement. A written-waiver clause and a cumulative remedies clause were decisive drafting choices.

  • Draft exits with care. Whether an exit obligation is ‘absolute’ or a best efforts undertaking can decide a nine or ten figure claim. State the valuation mechanism, the alternatives and the consequences of failure.

  • Know Section 50. An order enforcing a foreign award has no appeal under the Act, and the Supreme Court will entertain a petition only to settle the law or in a case of blatant disregard of Section 48.

  • Weigh the costs of delay. Two rounds of ₹25 lakh costs per Investor show how courts view opportunistic objections to enforcement.

Cross-Border Disputes Are Won on Two Skills

This case was fought on two levels. Lawyers on the Investors’ side knew the enforcement framework cold, from Section 48 to the seat and enforcement court relationship. And the SASHA itself, an exit waterfall with a written-waiver clause and a cumulative remedies clause, was drafted well enough to survive three courts and a tribunal. Both skills can be learned.

Into Legal World’s Advanced Certificate Course in Arbitration & Dispute Resolution prepares law students and lawyers to work on arbitration and enforcement questions like these. To build the drafting muscle behind shareholder agreements, exit clauses and remedies provisions, pair it with Advanced Legal Drafting 6.0, which offers live classes, recorded lectures, downloadable drafts, 1:1 mentorship and placement support. ILW has trained more than 1,05,000 legal professionals since 2018, and you can explore every programme at intolegalworld.com.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is transnational issue estoppel, and did the Supreme Court adopt it in Nagaraj V. Mylandla v. PI Opportunities Fund-I (2026 INSC 298)?

Transnational issue estoppel extends issue estoppel to international commercial arbitration, so that an issue decided by the seat court cannot be relitigated before the enforcement court. The Supreme Court noted that it had no earlier decision on the doctrine, found no error in the Madras High Court’s application of it, and held that it effectively curbs relitigation of settled factual issues while narrowing an enforcement court’s interference with an award that has passed muster at the seat.

Can a party who lost a set-aside challenge at the seat court re-argue the same issues to resist enforcement of a foreign award in India?

No, not on factual or merits issues that the seat court has already settled. The Supreme Court held that a merits-based evaluation is beyond the enforcement court’s jurisdiction under Section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and that a party whose contentions on facts were rejected by the seat court cannot seek review of them in India, even by relabelling them as public policy objections.

Can public policy of India still be raised under Section 48(2)(b) after the seat court upholds the award?

Yes, but narrowly. Following the Singapore Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Republic of India v. Deutsche Telekom, the Supreme Court accepted that a challenge based on the public policy of the enforcement state stands on a different footing, and the enforcement court must still examine it against Indian public policy. The ground covers fraud or corruption, contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law and conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice, and it does not permit a review on the merits.

Is surrender of shares against payment of damages a buy-back under the Companies Act?

Not on these facts. The Supreme Court upheld the distinction between a company’s buy-back of its own shares and a shareholder’s surrender of shares. Here the Investors offered to surrender their shares on payment of awarded damages, the award did not name the recipient, and if the promoters paid, the shares would go to them, which is neither a buy-back by FSSPL nor a reduction of capital. Sections 66 to 68 of the Companies Act, 2013 therefore had no application.

What are the citation, Bench and costs in this judgment?

The judgment is reported as 2026 INSC 298 and was decided on 25 March 2026 by Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice K. Vinod Chandran, with Justice Sanjay Kumar authoring it. It arises from SLP (Civil) Nos. 31866-68 of 2025 and 31945-31947 of 2025 against the Madras High Court’s order of 22.09.2025 enforcing a SIAC award dated 05.07.2024. The petitions were dismissed with further costs of ₹25,00,000 payable by the Mylandlas jointly to each of the Investors.

Read the full judgment: Download PDF | View on Google Drive

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Keywords: 2026 INSC 298, Nagaraj V. Mylandla v. PI Opportunities Fund-I, transnational issue estoppel India, enforcement of foreign arbitral award India, Section 48 public policy of India, Section 48(2)(b) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, SIAC award enforcement India, Singapore International Arbitration Centre award, seat court and enforcement court, Section 49 foreign award decree, Section 50 appeal foreign award, Section 44(b) notified territories, Vijay Karia v. Prysmian, PASL Wind Solutions v. GE Power Conversion, Republic of India v. Deutsche Telekom, shareholders agreement exit clause, buy-back vs surrender of shares Companies Act, Specific Relief Act arbitral award, Madras High Court foreign award, Supreme Court arbitration judgment 2026, Arbitration and Dispute Resolution course, Advanced Legal Drafting course


 
 
 

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