REVISITING SEDITION LAWS AFTER THE LAW COMMISSION’S RECENT REPORT

Author: Sarthak, National Law University

The Indian law of sedition, which is enshrined under Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, has been a cause of constitutional and political dispute for many decades. First brought into force by the British colonial government as a tool to stifle opposition and criminalize criticism against the government, the provision has quite frequently been decried as against the spirit of democracy and free speech. In a recent development, the 22nd Law Commission of India, in its Report No. 279 (2023), has recommended retaining Section 124A, albeit with some procedural safeguards, reviving speculations about its place in a modern constitutional republic.

Section 124A criminalizes any act that causes or attempts to cause to bring into hatred or contempt, or to excite or attempt to excite disaffection towards the government of the land. The provision is punishable with imprisonment for life. It was used in the past against freedom fighters such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Mahatma Gandhi, symbolizing its colonial abuse. After independence, the constitutional validity of the law of sedition came under challenge in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar [(1962) SCR Supl. (2) 769], where the Supreme Court upheld the law but limited its application to actions involving incitement to violence or an intention to cause public disorder. Such interpretation limited the scope of sedition and brought it into consonance with Article 19(2) of the Constitution, which allows reasonable restrictions on free speech.

The 22nd Law Commission in its 2023 report refused to grant the call for total repeal of the sedition law. It contended that the offence still remains one having a legitimate objective in preserving national sovereignty and integrity, especially during this era of terrorism, insurgency, and secessionist tendencies. The Commission nonetheless suggested changing the provision to make express inclusion of the Kedar Nath threshold of incitement to violence so as to confine its abuse.

In addition, the Commission recommended procedural protections such as advance sanction by a central government agency prior to proceeding with sedition cases, to avoid arbitrary use by local police. Although these recommendations are intended to meet concerns of abuse, they also demonstrate the State's ongoing use of colonial-era instruments to uphold public order.

The Law Commission's approval of sedition is not at ease with democratic values and constitutional morality. The critics opine that in the absence of definitions and without judicial protection, sedition continues to be used against journalists, students, and activists for holding views critical of the government. The chilling effect this produces on free speech endangers the diversity of public debate—an indispensable feature of an efficient democracy.

Besides, the line between criticism of the government and encouraging violence is usually suspect in political times. The Supreme Court in SG Vombatkere v. Union of India (2022) recognized these fears and suspended the provision, calling on the government to reassess its applicability. Yet, the Law Commission's report seems to be opposed to this spirit of reform.

While national security is undeniably paramount, laws like sedition must not become instruments to suppress dissent. The Law Commission’s recommendations, though intended to curtail misuse, fall short of addressing the foundational constitutional concern—whether the existence of such a provision is compatible with the ethos of a democratic republic. In the wake of changing jurisprudence and international democratic norms, the moment is opportune for India to reexamine not only the abuse, but the necessity of sedition legislation in a contemporary constitutional democracy.